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Reflections on Reading Plato and Aristotle in Lancaster1 
 
Daniel R. DeNicola 
 
I. Text and Context 
 
While serving as a Visiting Fellow at Lancaster University, I was asked to lead an informal 
seminar on Classical Philosophy. It was to be a reading group of postgraduate students and 
staff, focusing on two foundational texts of Western civilization: Plato’s Republic and 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I happily accepted. The resulting two-hour, weekly sessions 
over Michaelmas Term were lively times of philosophical effervescence, full of probative 
questions, interesting interpretations, diverse evaluations, vigorous debates, and shared 
insights. Postmodernists engaged in the holy act of Interpreting the Text, we nonetheless 
strained to grasp the “true meaning” of the texts, to extend our range of charitable 
understanding across twenty-four centuries of linguistic and cultural difference, and then to 
examine that meaning in light of our contemporary context and personal perspectives. 
However successful that collective exercise may have been, it was certainly provocative. 
 The Republic and the Nicomachean Ethics are majestic and magisterial. Masterworks 
of two philosophical patriarchs, they come to us through the labors (and filters) of generations 
of scholars who unearthed, preserved, transliterated, translated, corrected, edited, annotated, 
and commented upon them. Their ideas are woven deeply into Western culture; they have 
each generated a vast and still-expanding scholarly literature, and they are surely among the 
most frequently taught texts in the contemporary world. They are, of course, very different 
texts: their authors, despite studious decades together, are famously different in philosophical 
outlook, creating a rivalry that established opposing polarities of thought. The two texts differ 
in genre and style, in purpose and topics, in methods and vision, in presuppositions and 
conclusions. Yet both are concerned with the elaboration of normativity, with how the 
governance of the good might be manifested in our lives. And both texts argue that some 
possible lives and some possible human arrangements are better than others. Indeed, both 
project ideally good lives.  
By contrast, my purpose in this little essay is quite modest. I won’t offer a grand 
vision, not even an exegesis of any portion of the texts; nor will I attempt to distill our 
conversations. Instead, I propose to reflect briefly on three broad, braided themes from these 
works: the hierarchies of the worthwhile, the place of the philosophic life, and “doing 
philosophy” as an activity. All of which will suggest reflexive observations about their 
inspirational source – our group reading of Plato and Aristotle in Lancaster – with which I 
will conclude.  
 
II. Hierarchies of the Worthwhile 
 
It is one thing to find an activity worthwhile, but quite another to claim it is more worthwhile 
than something else. We tolerate, sometimes are even buoyed by, the fact that our fellow 
human beings find so many different activities to be not just pleasurable, but worthwhile. 
From football to opera, from poetry to social media, from philately to philosophy – it is a 
dazzling array, a sustaining profusion of apparently good things. We might debate their 
extrinsic value, their utilitarian payoff; but we hesitate to dispute claims that they are also 
valuable in themselves, because we will soon be led into the mysteries of justifying intrinsic 
                                                
1 For this experience, I am grateful to Oliver Thorne, who instigated and organised the group, and to the other regular participants: Phil 
Chandler, Martha Ebbeson, Natalia Klaaser, Nicola Mathie, Dan Palmer, Tom Randall, Faye Tucker, and Tom Wolstenholme. My thanks 
also go to my home institution, Gettysburg College, and to Lancaster University for this opportunity.    
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value. In a way, the forceful claim that something has intrinsic worth, that it is valuable for its 
own sake, seems an attempt to end debate, to assert that further justification is otiose. 
Claiming that two very different activities both have intrinsic value sets up an uneasy truce; 
the question then is whether there are two different values or two manifestations of the same 
value in play. But claiming that one activity is better than the other, “higher” or more 
worthwhile, is an incitement; the more worthwhile gains a normative pull over the less so, 
hegemony of the better over the not-so-good. It is a comparative judgment, one that assumes 
some discernible difference in the amount or level of goodness of things. It is a judgment that 
seems, in the negative sense, judgmental.   
 For Plato, all value devolves from a transcendent unity, an ideal of the Good that is 
also the ideal of the True and of Beautiful.2 This supreme and ineffable ideal subtends many 
hierarchies; hierarchies which, in reverse movement, serve as ladders of perfectibility. The 
Republic alone presents progressive levels that are ontological (entities from shadows to the 
highest Forms possessing increasing reality, permanence, and perfection); epistemological 
(increasingly reliable objects, forms of knowledge, and ranges of expertise); political (forms 
of social arrangements that range from tyranny to the just kallipolis); social (from artisans to 
the philosopher-king); psychological (from the body and its appetites to the mind in its 
rational splendor) – and more! Such hierarchies determine the comparative worth of pursuits: 
working with the hands is less noble than working with the mind; painting is lower than 
mathematics.  While those activities that help a soul ascend these ladders (especially dialectic) 
are certainly worthwhile, nothing is better than the rare moment of knowing the Form of the 
Good (noesis).  
Whereas Plato’s vision is structural, Aristotle’s is functional. Whereas Plato’s 
conception of goodness is a transcendental ideal, Aristotle’s is a dynamic sense of flourishing. 
And what determines and draws forth flourishing is a telos, an inherent goal or “final cause.” 
The entire cosmos and all within in it are understood teleologically. Within this system, those 
activities that conduce to the end have extrinsic value; the telos itself has intrinsic value. In 
addition, teloi are nested; they may become means to or components of other teloi, displaying 
a grand hierarchy we have come to call “the Great Chain of Being.” Aristotle delineates 
special periods of time in which we can realise our telos (pursue activities for their own sake): 
leisure. The optimal life will flourish in having the greatest scope for and experience of the 
most worthwhile activities of which it is capable. Aristotle argues that wise use of our reason 
is our generic human telos, and that theoretical reasoning (theoria), a knowing contemplation, 
is the pinnacle of human experience.  
The confident presumptuousness of such judgments has not gone unnoticed. A 
particularly vociferous attack was authored by philosopher-turned-politician, Oliver Letwin.3 
He briskly examines and rejects various bases on which to establish such a hierarchy. Though 
he acknowledges that there are grounds for judging one poem better than another, one football 
game better than another, Letwin asserts that there is no ground for judging poetry as more 
worthwhile than football or vice versa. Practices cannot be ranked. He declares, “the 
hierarchy of activities is […] no more than myth.” And the myth is not harmless. Letwin 
claims, “the myth does […] have a tendency to provoke shame and guilt, and thereby to 
undermine a person’s sense of the importance of standards in each of the activities he 
undertakes.” It has “a capacity not only to mislead intellectually but also harm morally.”   
                                                
2 Goodness (agathou), truth (aletheia), and beauty (kalón) are nowhere in Plato’s writings explicitly connected as a doctrine of ultimate 
value, yet both the transcendence and unity of these values underlies the entire body of his work.  The Republic, of course, centers on the 
relationship between the first two. 
3 O Letwin, Ethics, Emotion and the Unity of the Self, Croom Helm, London, 1987. This attack occupies Chapter 2, and the quoted passages 
in this paragraph are found on p. 28.   
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In Letwin’s view, the moment at which such an evil is born is the dividing of the soul 
(psychē) or self into “higher” and “lower” parts.4 In fact, he sorts philosophers into two types:  
those that partition the self, he calls “Romantics”; those that retain an integrated self, he calls 
“Classicists.” Plato is, in his account, “an archetypal philosophical Romantic”: one who finds 
the human condition unsatisfactory; who seeks release from the “ultimate disjunctions” of 
human existence, the liberation of a true self from its degrading baggage; one who is nostalgia 
for our real home. Aristotle, by contrast, is a Classicist, who sees the material and the abstract 
merely as two perspectives; who maintains a unified self, in which body and mind, passion 
and reason, are integrated; who sources value within, not beyond, human experience.   
Letwin is undeniably painting with a very broad brush – he also labels Kant and Freud 
as Romantics, and Hegel as a Classicist – but the image is telling. He portrays the divided self 
as the origin of hierarchies of activities; that partitioning does not, however, provide 
justification.   He reviews and soundly rejects a list of purported bases for judging “higher” 
and “lower” activities.  Though I cannot defend the point here, I find that Letwin argues 
dismissively and precipitously; and, were his arguments valid, they would undermine the 
claim that any activity is worthwhile, not just that one is objectively better than another.  
Moreover, I think Letwin may have misjudged the pivotal point. After all, Aristotle – 
Classicist though he may be – indulges in an extensive attempt to rank forms of life and the 
activities they involve; in the Nicomachean Ethics, he sets our specific criteria for his 
judgments. Rather, I believe the key to such hierarchies, the place to start, is the phenomenon 
of intrinsic value, not the divided self. In fact, the latter may well derive from the former. That 
something is intrinsically worthwhile seems self-evident to those who experience it, and 
impossible to justify to those who do not.   
 
III. The Philosophic Life 
 
Nearly all Classical philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, are keenly concerned to 
convey a conception of the good life. By implication if not explicitly, they tell us what is of 
value, what we should seek and praise, and how we should live. Their advice gains depth 
through their analyses of human nature, through their speculative visions of the cosmos in 
which we dwell, and through their projections of the ultimate grounds of the human prospect. 
For most of these thinkers, philosophy is a way of living – and the good life is a philosophical 
one.    
 If today we think of Socrates as the iconic philosopher, it is due to Plato. It is 
Socrates’ trial and execution that spur Plato to his philosophical writing; all his works save 
one (the last work, Laws) honor Socrates through their use of dialogue in which Socrates 
himself is usually chief interlocutor. His writings present episodes of the philosopher in 
action, and for Plato philosophy is personal: the character of his interlocutors is revealed in 
their philosophising, and they are shaped by the philosophy they espouse. Philosophy is not a 
body of esoteric knowledge, but a fierce and consuming art that has urgency and moment, and 
is unsettling when engaged in with genuine conviction.    
Plato’s Republic is a philosophical disquisition on whether being a just or moral 
person is worthwhile; and, if it is, is it justified extrinsically, intrinsically, or both. It soon 
takes the form of an elaborate thought-experiment. It is serious play. As though placing 
figures in a dollhouse, Plato has his interlocutors envision the just person and arrange an 
optimal setting, the just state.   In this, the first utopian tract, the optimal lives of all citizens 
depend on the wisdom of the philosopher. Plato elevates the philosopher as the one who is 
truly wise, and who therefore is in the best position to shape a life and a society. One doesn’t 
stumble into enlightenment. The philosophical life is demanding. The long first phase entails 
                                                
4 Ibid. The argument concerning the divided soul and Romanticism vs. Classicism occupies Chapter 1.   
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intense training and the devoted search for truth; for the rare one who apprehends truth and its 
goodness and beauty, the second phase requires living out the impact of that apprehension, 
structuring one’s life and even one’s community in light of that vision.  For Plato, an 
encounter with the Form of the Good, True, and Beautiful is not merely a startling flash of 
understanding; it is a transformative experience, and we are different as a result. Seeing the 
truth ennobles us and improves us; we acquire a small spark of its goodness and beauty. 
 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle articulates a rich conception of virtues and 
vices. He identifies two types: moral and intellectual. Together these form an ecology of 
character that is conducive to a good life – more precisely, to a flourishing life of happiness 
and self-actualisation (eudaimonia) in which we actively employ our highest capacities with 
excellence.  But although Aristotle celebrates the interpretation of the good life as a life of 
practical wisdom, he ultimately argues that the purpose of practical wisdom is to facilitate 
theoretical wisdom. In short, philosophising is the most worthwhile human pursuit of all.5 
 This claim that the philosophic life is the optimal life, or that only a philosophical life 
is a good life, is one source of the charge of elitism often made against these thinkers. After 
all, the capacity for and interest in abstract philosophical thought are not distributed equally; 
the consequence is that access to a good life is not equitably available. Moreover, the fact that 
accomplished philosophers pronounce this claim suggests bias and arrogance: leisured, male 
aristocrats opining that the best life is the life of the leisured, male aristocrat. There is surely a 
weighty portion of truth in that charge. Of course, philosophical engagement requires security 
and peace and time for reflection – as both philosophers acknowledge; one cannot 
philosophise when mere survival is the concern. But it is not so much the account of what is 
required for a philosophical life that is objectionable; nor is it the claim that a philosophical 
life is good; it is the claim that such a life is the optimal life, the one truly good life.   
There may, however, be something going on besides the arrogation of values. When 
we take seriously the question, “What is the good life?” we may find ourselves in a 
predicament parallel to the one who asks: “Why should I be rational?” To ask the latter 
question seriously is to search for reasons, and therefore to be already “playing the game” of 
rationality; it begs the question in the sort of transcendental way exploited by Immanuel Kant. 
Rationality seems to be a necessary presumption of the question. Similarly, when we consider 
“What is the good life?” we are thereby engaged in philosophical inquiry and beg the question 
as to whether its pursuit is worthwhile. Taking an activity to be worthwhile is, of course, not 
the same as claiming it is the most worthwhile of activities (the summum bonum); far less is it 
the claim that, as such, the activity should define a life.     
Neither Plato nor Aristotle imagines that we could compartmentalise our 
philosophising as one worthwhile activity among many – a component of the good life, but 
not necessarily the summum bonum. Both men believe that the highest good will in fact 
become the defining focus of a good life, so pervasive as to characterise a life and to give life 
to character. We cannot dabble in the highest good; it claims us when we pursue it seriously. 
Both men believe that the good ramifies in our lives. Their versions of this ramification of the 
good differ, however.   Plato’s notion is that the Form of the Good attracts us (through our 
eros) and inspires our imitation of it (mimesis); it alters our soul, which alters our life, which 
in turn may alter our community. The truly good “governs,” giving a life both integrity and 
liberation. For Aristotle, it is the telos, our natural fulfillment that orders our efforts, summons 
our virtues, and shapes our life and our community. The activity of reason is our self-
                                                
5 These judgments are especially interesting when one considers that both intellectual men were clearly committed to practical projects: they 
each founded and led a school, and their efforts were strong enough to create institutions that survived them. Philosophical activity was at the 
heart of these institutions, but there were surely practical matters that frequently required attention. I especially marvel at Aristotle, who – 
given his brilliant and polymathic output, given the diverse collections and activities of the Lyceum, and given his own researches – must 
also have mastered time management.   
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actualisation, and its exercise requires much of our moral and intellectual character. In both 
versions, the ramification of the good pulls us to a philosophic life.  
 
IV. Philosophy as an Activity 
 
The hegemonic advocacy for the philosophical life as the good life might well be seen as self-
deceptive. Aristotle explicitly argues for self-sufficiency as a criterion in determining 
worthwhile activities; the contemplative life, the life of theoretical wisdom (sophia) is 
crowned the optimal life, in part, because it is the most self-sufficient. Yet the time, space, 
and opportunity for philosophy are, he acknowledges incidentally, dependent upon practical 
reasoning and the efforts of others. Philosophising depends on, among other factors, 
education, leisure, sustenance, shelter, relative peace and security – all of which depend on 
excellences in the practical and productive activities of others.  It takes a polis.   
 Both philosophers argue that the good life for individuals requires a good community. 
Plato affirms this mutual dependence in the Republic, an insight that problematises the path to 
the establishment of his kallipolis: the just state requires optimised citizens, who are quite 
improbable unless they were reared in a just state. But in the Republic, he clearly ranks the 
thriving of the state of greater importance than the happiness (eudaimonia) of any individual 
or class.6  Aristotle eschews such totalitarianism, yet the good community remains essential 
for the good life. It serves as the nurturing and formative context for individual character and 
the theater in which virtues and vices are displayed. Especially when combined with the 
Politics, the Nicomachean Ethics portrays the good life not only as contributing to the 
sustaining of a good community, but also as formed and expressed in communal engagement.   
 To what extent, then, is philosophy an individual or a group activity? Is the 
philosophical life one of solitary contemplation or is it one of dynamic social interaction? 
There is a deep tension in these ancient philosophers between the individual and the 
communal aspects of philosophy. At its core, the conflict arises from the pairing of a 
subjective and individualistic epistemology with a communitarian arena for the good life.  
 The dominant epistemological metaphor in Classical philosophy is that knowing is a 
form of seeing. The apprehension of truth (noesis) is an occasion in the mental life an 
individual, a private epiphany of insight – though a potentially transformative event with a 
range of manifestations. Even when a truth is unfolded in a series of steps – as, for example, 
in a Euclidean geometrical proof – there is the presumption of an individual consciousness 
that assents to each deduction, silently affirming the logic of each step and the validity of the 
conclusion. Enlightenment dawns within one soul at a time. Philosophising is an activity of 
and within individual minds – a lonely and, in a Socratic mode, heroic activity.   
 For Plato and Aristotle, we are individualised by our souls. From Socrates onward, the 
soul (psychē) is the moral and intellectual center of personhood, and the health of the soul is a 
major, if not the primary, concern of philosophy. The normative project – whether seen as 
character formation, flourishing, transcendence, or escape from earthly strictures (salvation) – 
is a project for individual souls. The Republic presents the soul’s career as one of 
epistemological and moral development that extends even beyond a single lifespan.7 For 
Plato, the soul seems to bear an individuality that is deeper than gender or relationships or 
even memory; yet it is more than a purely ontological individuality, because it retains a 
cumulative normativity. For Aristotle, the human soul defines a type of being. The good life – 
a flourishing of the soul supported by a healthy body – may be profiled generically; it derives 
from a perfection of human nature. The Aristotelian soul is the gendered structure of the 
human body that enables all its vital capacities. Yet the soul also facilitates a character that is 
                                                
6 Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, 1992, IV, 420b. 
7 See the Myth of Er, Republic, X, 614-21. 
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individual; its development, excellences, and happiness are individual. For both men it is the 
mind with its ability to cognise and to reason, the most wonderful aspect of the person, that 
gives us our stature in the cosmos. 
 These reflections suggest that philosophising is a private activity of individual souls or 
minds. Philosophy arises wondrously within individuals, is carried on by individuals, and 
aims to improve the lives of individuals. Yet this is not the whole story, for there are strong 
elements in Classical philosophy that suggest it is a collective pursuit with communitarian 
aims.   
 One might immediately point to Plato’s use of dialogue. He began his work in thrall of 
Socrates for whom philosophical dialogue with others was a deep need, a mission, and a life’s 
work. Philosophy consisted in purposeful conversation with others. Plato, pace Socrates, also 
pursued philosophical thinking through writing, though in dialogue form to capture the give-
and-take of multiple thinkers’ viewpoints. Admittedly, this style faded over his career: the 
dialogues became more a discourse of his own dialectical thinking, less a vivid record of 
different people’s viewpoints. But taken as a whole, the Platonic corpus celebrates philosophy 
as dialogue, as an activity that requires a community, or at least an attentive group of 
responsive thinkers.   
 None of Aristotle’s early dialogues is extant, and judging from what has survived, 
they may not be representative of his mature views. Yet even Aristotle’s analytic tracts 
usually situate his thought within the larger community of philosophers, those thinkers who 
addressed the same issues in the past. He routinely makes astute use of the testimony of other 
philosophic researchers. He elevates a sense of a philosophical conversation that transcends 
time and space.  Aristotle, more than any other ancient thinker, envisions philosophy as a 
richly diverse yet continuous, critical tradition.   
 Both Plato and Aristotle institutionalised philosophy by founding their respective 
schools. Though Plato’s Academy emphasised education and Aristotle’s Lyceum emphasized 
research, both provided venues for philosophising. Plato’s intellectual progenitor, Pythagoras, 
established the pattern of gathering an adult group to pursue philosophy; but, although his 
“brotherhood” conducted significant research, it also seems like a charismatic cult of like-
minded believers. The “schools of thought” in Classical philosophy often coalesced in real 
institutions or communities: the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Neo-Platonists all organised 
philosophical communes. Epicurus’ Garden and Plotinus’ school were not simply designed to 
propagate their philosophical doctrines; they were also embodiments of a philosophical way 
of living, the good life in community. 
 The tension between philosophy as individual and communal reveals a lack or 
dissonance between treatments of the moral and the intellectual. What is missing is a 
communal epistemology. Aristotle may come closer than Plato to this idea, or at least his 
views are more compatible with the possibility. He distinguishes a category of intellectual 
virtues distinct from moral virtues. His consideration of moral virtues and vices – their nature 
and varieties, how they may be acquired, how they may be practiced and modeled – is 
extensive and elaborate. Though these are settled qualities of individual characters, the family 
and the political community are, as I noted, essential as the incubator of these virtues and the 
arena in which they are displayed. The intellectual virtues, by contrast, though crucially 
important for the optimal life, are given a truncated treatment. These virtues and vices of the 
rational soul are likewise qualities of individuals’ minds. But the family and the political 
community comprise a moral, not an intellectual arena. At best, society is seen as a venue for 
the application of practical reasoning, not an interactive intellectual community.   
We might say the Greeks had an epistemic community in practice, but not in theory. 
Perhaps we are simply left with the notion that philosophical activity must display a rhythm, 
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an oscillation between the private and the communal, between ruminating and apprehending 
at one time, and collegial interaction – listening, sharing, responding, and debating – at others.   
   
V. Reading Plato and Aristotle in Lancaster 
 
Any voluntary, faithful reading group presumably has judged the activity worthwhile. The 
group may include scholars for whom familiarity with the focal text may have utilitarian 
benefits for their later career’s work. But there is a phenomenological difference, I believe, 
when we engage in something in which we find intrinsic value. Our sense of time alters: we 
don’t feel the need to “get through” the experience, because we are already at the goal. We 
experience a flow in which we are immersed in the activity, our energies are focused, and 
time passes without our notice, except as interruption or boundary – when we feel the 
pressures of the obligatory. Plato once compared this state to being a free man, rather than a 
slave.8 This phenomenology is especially vivid when it is a shared engagement, when a group 
is valuing the experience intrinsically. That gives the group its effervescence. But what 
exactly is shared? 
A shared valuation of the reading experience does not imply shared perspectives and 
evaluations of the text. But in our case, the group was reading texts that celebrate the 
philosophic life, that claim the good life is philosophical. Were not we, then, while busily 
engaging in philosophical discussions about Plato and Aristotle, tacitly endorsing their claim? 
No. Valuing philosophy as an activity does not entail valuing particular philosophical 
conclusions – even about philosophy, since the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophical 
issue. In fact, many participants dissented vigorously from the visions of the good life dilated 
by Plato and Aristotle, and others proposed qualifications or amendments to these visions. 
There are at least three possible points of divergence: (1) One may argue that these 
philosophical patriarchs go wrong in assuming a monistic or unified theory of value; that 
worthwhile activities do not form a single hierarchy capped by a summum bonum. (2) One 
may argue that both men falter when they make the extrapolation from worthwhile activity to 
good life; that a good life is not defined by the sustaining of the highest human state or 
activity. (3) Or one may argue that the good and true simply do not ramify in the ways and 
patterns envisioned by these thinkers. And here the critiques widen: perhaps they are mistaken 
about the most worthwhile activity; maybe their constructions of the social order, of 
education, of human nature are misguided; or perhaps these specific errors devolve from other 
metaphysical or epistemological defects. Though we well might dissent in these ways – and 
all were represented in our group – we need not deny that engaging with these texts 
philosophically was worthwhile. Such an experience might surely be embraced as part of the 
“good” in a good life.  
The texts are, in the end, provocations to philosophise. “Doing philosophy” or 
philosophising is a complex activity. To speak of it as a single activity (identified with 
dialectic, theoria, or whatever) may be misleading. Contemplating, reasoning, apprehending, 
analysing, clarifying, proposing, refuting, and offering counterexamples, and so on, are all 
distinct activities. Each and all can be aspects of philosophising. To “do” these is effectively 
to be a citizen of an epistemic community, a particular kind of regulative, epistemic 
community that is philosophical. It is in such a community that the intellectual virtues are 
formed and employed.   Curiosity, attention to detail and nuance, the ability to grasp other’s 
perspectives, a sense of salience, respect for evidence, intellectual humility, expressive 
courage – these and others are virtues that underpin the doing of philosophy with excellence.    
To comprehend the activity of a philosophical seminar we not only need a conception of 
worthwhile activities, an understanding of textual explication, and knowledge of the various 
                                                
8 Theaetetus, 172d-e.  
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activities of philosophy; we not only need to understand the epistemology of individual 
insight.  We also need to understand the group as a regulative epistemic community and the 
intellectual virtues (and vices) that may be displayed therein. In short, we need an 
epistemology adequate for philosophy itself. 
